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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Loren Kelly Farnsworth appeals from a final order of the Emery 
County Seventh District Court entered by the Honorable Douglas B. Thomas 
on March 15, 2011. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4-
103(2)(h). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: The trial court ignored Petitioner's historical standard of 
living and awarded sufficient alimony to allow Petitioner to purchase a home 
worth twice as much as the home she had lived in during the entire marriage. 
That inflated the Petitioner's monthly mortgage requirement by $710.00. 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by creating a standard of living for 
Petitioner that never existed during the marriage? 
Where Preserved: R. 139:83-86. 
Standard of Review: Trial court alimony awards are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Connell v. Connell, 233 P.3d 836, 839 (Utah 
Ct.App. 2010). 
Issue 2: The parties' minor child will be an adult in less than five 
years. Despite that, the trial court awarded $200/month for 22 years as 
permanent alimony to Petitioner to pay the child's temporary hobby 
expenses. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 1) overcalculating the 
1 
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amount of the hobby expenses; and 2) converting the child's temporary 
hobby expenses into Petitioner's permanent alimony need? 
Where Preserved: R. 139:87-88 
Standard of Review: Trial court alimony awards are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Connell v. Connell, 233 P.3d 836, 839 (Utah 
Ct.App.2010). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are of central importance to this appeal and are 
included in the Addendum, due to length: 
UTAH CODE §30-3-5 (2011). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
A. Nature of the Case 
Paige Christine Farnsworth ("Wife") filed for divorce against Loren 
Kelly Farnsworth ("Husband") seeking an award of alimony, custody of the 
minor child, and appropriate orders concerning child support, property 
settlement, and parent time. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Prior to trial, the parties settled all outstanding issues in the divorce 
except for alimony and property division. (R. 139:3-6). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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C. Disposition in the Court Below 
A bench trial was conducted on February 4, 2011. (R.082). On March 
15, 2011, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Decree of Divorce. (R.091; R.102). Respondent's Notice of Appeal was 
timely filed on April 8, 2011. (R.l 13). 
D. Statement of Relevant Facts 
The parties were married August 27, 1998. (R.091:l). During the 
marriage, the parties acquired a house on 2.83 acres of real property. 
(R.091:7; R.140: Exhibit 004, Page 10). The house had been built in 1900. 
(R.140: Exhibit 004, Page 10). The home was the parties' marital residence 
during virtually the entire marriage. (R. 139:81). When the parties separated, 
Husband moved from the marital residence and Wife remained in the house 
with the parties' 12-year-old daughter. The house is valued at $68,000 and 
is paid for. (R.139:18, R.139:22, R.140: Exhibit 004; R.139:52). 
During the marriage, the parties never made any improvements to the 
property and made only those repairs that were critical. (R.l39:19). Early in 
their marriage, the parties decided not to make repairs to the home in case 
they should lose the house and the value of the repairs. (R. 139:52-54). 
After the house was paid for, the parties continued to discuss repairing the 
3 
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home but never did. Instead, the parties spent virtually all of their 
discretionary income on hunting. (R. 139:19; R. 139:52-54). 
At trial, Wife requested sufficient alimony to allow her to purchase a 
home for $185,000. The home she had chosen was on 3 acres of real 
property, was several thousand square feet larger than the marital home, was 
only 12-15 years old, and did not need any repairs. (R. 139:25-27). 
The trial court determined that $ 185,000 was excessive but awarded 
Wife sufficient alimony to purchase a $140,000 home, with no money down. 
(R.091:5). That amount, combined with the equity she received for her 
share of the marital home ($34,000.00) approximated Wife's original 
demand. The trial court awarded the marital home to Husband and ordered 
him to pay to Wife her share of equity in the marital home. Husband would 
then be required to invest $70,000 to repair the marital home, after which he 
would also have a home worth $140,000. (R.091:6-7). 
The trial court also awarded Wife an additional $200/month for a full 
22 years, to reimburse her for the hay and feed that the minor child used to 
raise pigs and feed her two horses. (R.091:6). The Court determined the 
feed amount to be $200 per month although the values presented at trial 
resulted in an amount between $57.50 and $133.33 per month. (R. 139:44-
48). 
A 
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M l MINIMA II Ill' \HI.HI\IM* IT 
' I he ti la 1 coi lit established Wife's alimoi ly 1:>> splitting ,-
rather awarding alimony based on Wife's historical standard of living. I o 
do so, the Court awarded enough alimony for Wife to purchase, without any 
down payment, a home worth $140,000. The trial court also awarded Wife 
$34,000 as her share of equity in the marital home. Wife had asked for a 
$ <s?,000 home and the Court ultimate!> au ,iu: ier enough casi . H\ a 
$11 M (»(III In in in" 
findings of fact that w* unsupportt r , \a -
Additionally, the trial court impermissibly included the minor 
child's temporary hobby expenses in Wife's permanent monthly alimony. 
The trial court's ruling in this regard converted the child's temporary hobby 
expense of about $7,000.00 (amortized over a 5-year period) to a permanent 
alimony amount 
ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court refused to base its alimony order on Wife's 
historical standard living, in violation of established precedent. 
The first factor that a court must consider when determining alimony 
is the financial condition and need of the recipient spouse.,1 4 trial coi irt 
1
 Ul AH CODE §30-3-5(8)(a)(i) (2011). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
require, regardless of the ability of the payor spouse to pay. To assess the 
recipient spouse's alimony need, the trial court must determine the standard 
of living that the parties established during the marriage. The purpose of 
alimony is to enable the recipient spouse to maintain as nearly as possible 
that same standard of living that was enjoyed during the marriage.4 
1. The trial court inaccurately determined Wife's alimony need. 
At trial, it was undisputed that the marital home was over 100-years-
old and the parties had lived there for over 20 years—virtually the entire 
marriage. The parties also agreed that they had never voluntarily made any 
improvements to the home, instead choosing to repair only critical items. 
During their entire marriage, the parties consciously chose to neglect the 
home and spend their discretionary income on hunting expenses. 
And so, the standard of living for both parties and their children was 
established—they had all lived in a 100-year-old/$68,000 house for at least 
twenty years, making few repairs. 
Husband agreed to give Wife the exact house she had always lived in, 
allowing her the same standard of living she had always enjoyed. Instead, 
Wife demanded a standard of living much better than she had ever enjoyed 
2
 Sellers v. Sellers, 246 P.3d 173, 75 (Utah Ct.App. 2010); See Olson v. Olson, 226 
P.3d 751, 756 (Utah Ct.App. 2010); See also Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 
1068 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). 
3
 Crompton v. Crompton, 888 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). 
4
 Cornell v. Cornell, 233 P.3d 836, 840 (Utah Ct.App. 2010.) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
during the marriage. Wife claimed her "need" was based on a $185,000 
house that she had located in the area. She wanted a home that was a "couple 
thousand" square feet larger, almost 100 years newer, on more acreage, and 
valued at almost three times that of the marital home. 
Apparently, the trial court largely agreed with Wife's demand. Ihe 
lull i < H ml III,lined lliK1 maiilal holm s hisrepan mi I In is ha nil, .iwmdeil 
illinium bused on the esdtnaled monthly paynieiil loi ,i $140,000 home 
(without any deposit), and also gave Wife $34,000 in equity from the marital 
home. The trial court tried to equalize the parties' post-divorce money by 
awarding Husband the marital home, randomly assigning a $70,000 cost to 
repair the marital home, and then declaring that the marital home would also 
III » e w o r t h $ 1 4 0 , 0 0 0 -. • • '.. .- . • • 
It is entirely Mil' win, lh< ln.il eonrl thought 1 lushaiHJ',s urn Wife 
housing need should be established at $140,000—instead of $120,000 or 
$158,000 or $185,000 or the $68,000 enjoyed during the marriage. It is also 
unclear why the trial court did not reduce Wife's estimated mortgage 
payment by the $34^000 that she received for her equit} he marital home. 
2. 77?e matshaieu e 1  i* nfe • 1  ? :: ie does not support inv * 
findings offset 
A trial court's factual findings must show that the judgment follows 
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The findings must also be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sufficiently detailed so as to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached.5 
The trial court in this case entered unsupported findings of fact to 
bolster its assessment of Wife's monthly need. The marshaled evidence in 
support of that determination is set forth below.6 
q. Findings of Fact found in Paragraph 12 
"The appraisal includes three acres of land and the Court believes that the 
land attributes to the amount of the appraisal, leaving little value in the 
home." 
• The Emery County tax assessor values the buildings on the land at 
$32,676.00 and the land at $33,648.00. (R.140: Exhibit 004, Page 10). 
• The house and land together appraised for $68,000.00. (R. 139:18, 
R. 139:22, R.140: Exhibit 004). 
".. .Respondent has failed to make repairs to the home... .The Court finds 
that Respondent allowed the home to fall in disrepair... Respondent bears 
the responsibility for the home's decline in value." 
• Wife testified that during the marriage, they did nothing to repair the 
home and only fixed what had to be fixed. (R. 139:19). 
• During the marriage, they talked about repairs all the time. Initially, 
they decided not to put improvements into the home in case they lost 
the house and lost the money they put into it. And even after the house 
was paid for, they never did any repairs or set money aside for repairs. 
Instead, they always used the money for hunting.( R. 139:52-54). 
• All of their excess money during the marriage went to hunting. 
(R.139:19). 
• The home was built in 1900. (R.140: Exhibit 004, Page 10). 
5
 Fish v. Fish, 242 P.3d 787,793 (Utah Ct.App. 2010). 
6
 Because the original Findings of Fact were not all separately stated, the 
disputed portion of the findings of fact is restated and the marshaled 
evidence is set forth below the disputed finding of fact, and is separately 
stated. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• m e current appraised condition of the home was "fair" (R. W: 
Exhibit 004, Page 2). 
• The home is at least 100 years old. (R.139:55). 
• The parties lived in the home for at least 20 years (R. 139:81). 
• A section of roof leaked in 2009 and a section fell down in 2010. 
(R.139:52). 
• The dry wall is still hanging down from the roof leak. The house 
needs a total bathroom re-do, new doors, new windows, and a roof 
patched. (R. 139:5?: P ^o^\ 
"Respondent has the ski 11 s necessary » to bi ii lg the I lome ii lto a habitable 
structure..." 
• There were mold issues in a wall and it needed to be repaired because 
Husband fixed it incorrectly, causing further damage to the bathroom. 
(R.139:52) 
• Husband scraped the snow off the roof and said it didn't leak anymore 
(R.139:52). 
"In light of this, Petitioner should be able to find living arrangements in the 
amount of $140,000.00 which would include the home and horse property to 
allow Petitioner to maintain the horses." 
• Wife had looked at a home with exactly 3 acres of property that was 
selling for $185,000.00 and the mortgage would be $912.00 per 
month. (R. 139:25, R. 139:37). The square footage difference between 
the marital residence and the new home was a couple thousand square 
feet. (R. 139:25). The new home doesn't need repairs and is only 12-
15 years old. (R.139:26). 
• When Wife filed for divorce, she planned to keep the marital home. 
(R.139:18). 
• Husband thinks it is better if Wife keeps the residence (R. 139:79). 
• Wife does not want the home because it needs repairs. (R. 139:19), 
• Wife wants a new house because the old house needs a new roof 
(R.139:51-52)(R.139:80). 
• The marital home has approximate!) 2.9 c ic res of pi opei t) , (R 139:25) 
(Appraisal at page 2—-2.83 acres) 
Q 
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"Petitioner testified that she could not rent a home for less than $600.00 per 
month and the Court finds the Petitioner would need $700.00 to $710.00 per 
month for a mortgage payment." 
• Rent in Orangeville, Utah was as hizh as $600.00 per month. 
(R. 139:26). 
b. Findings of Fact found in Paragraph 13 
"The court finds that Respondent will need to make repairs to the marital 
residence that will be awarded to him. The court finds that those repairs will 
cost about $70,000.00. Respondent will likely need to borrow money to 
make the repairs and that his monthly loan payment for those repairs and 
equity payment will be approximately $560.00 per month. Once 
Respondent makes the repairs, his residence will then be valued at 
approximately $140,000.00. Respondent and Petitioner will then have equal 
housing arrangements.. .The minor child deserves to have an appropriate 
place to live and stay when she is with each parent." 
• No admissible evidence was presented at trial on any of the items 
noted in the finding of fact. 
3. Explanation. 
Based on the evidence at trial, the trial court could have concluded 
that the house structure comprised approximately 50% of the appraised 
value of the house and land, but not less. Additionally, there is no evidence 
in the record that the marital home ever "fell into disrepair" or "declined in 
value." Instead, the house was 88 years old when the parties married. They 
discussed repairs often during the marriage, but deliberately chose to forego 
those repairs for various reasons. It is as likely that the home was in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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house ever declined in value. 
Importantly, Wife's testimony at trial was that the parties mutually 
decided to forego repairs on the home during the entire marriage. They 
never made any repairs that weren't absolutely necessary It wasn't just 
I liishaiiil's decision Accordingly , llic\ are |oinll ' lesponsible lor Ihe 
< ur ren l s t a l e o f Ihe i n a i iil.ill h o i i i c . ; • . . •. ... 
As for the ability to make repairs, it is also clear that Husband and 
Wife are similarly situated. All agreed that Wife did not have the skills. 
But all apparently agree that Husband did not have the skills. His bathroom 
repair resulted in additional damage and he "fixed" the leaking roof by 
simply sho veling snow away from the leak \ \ idence was presented to 
tl lat I In shall id has am hand"", man A fills. 
1 here wa«« no e\ N'IHHV presents I in fir . . •-
habitable or that it was an inappropriate place for the minor child to stay 
with a parent. Instead, the minor child, her older sister, Husband, and Wife 
all lived in this house for the duration of the marriage and the minor child 
and Wife were still living in the house at the time of trial VII agreed that 
11K1 house 'needed' some repairs and had a leak my looi'hul il wiiu otherwise 
habitable and had appai eiitl.) beei 1 habitab- •• 5. 
11 
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There was no evidence at trial supporting the trial court's conclusion 
that Wife was entitled to a home valued at $140,000.00. She asked for a 
$185,000 house that she had actually located and wanted to purchase. But 
no fact at trial discussed the availability of a $140,000 house, whether it 
would have equivalent acreage or square footage, what the associated 
mortgage cost would be, or what interest rate would apply. And, as 
explained above, there was no basis for the Court to determine that $140,000 
is the applicable value for housing where Wife lived in the marital home for 
the entire marriage and it was available to her. 
Importantly, Wife never testified that she could not rent a home for 
less than $600 per month. She testified that apartments in Orangeville "are 
going up to $600 a month". 
Very little evidence was introduced at trial about the repairs that 
might be required to improve the marital house. No testimony was 
introduced about which repairs were necessary or if they were simply 
desired by Wife. No testimony was admitted at trial as to the cost of the 
repairs or what items would be fixed. There was no evidence to indicate that 
$70,000 was a required amount for repairs or that, if those repairs were 
made, that the $70,000 investment would directly correlate with a $70,000 
increase in the overall value of the home. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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During Husband's closing argument, counsel cited Sellers v. Sellers to 
explain the accurate measure of alimony in the case. But the trial judge had 
this to say: 
'It's unrealistic for [Husband] to presume that [Wife] is 
going to be able to go out and find a home worth $66,000 
and live in that with a child and be able to do the things that 
she needs to do. It's unrealistic for [Husband] to presume 
that [Husband's] 201ns to set away with a $300 or $400 
alimony a month award on a 22 Vi year marriage.' 
It is apparent from the trial court's statement and ultimate ruling that it had 
no intention of limiting its alimony award to Wife's historical standard of 
living. Instead, the trial court recognized that Husband had the ability to 
pay more than Wife needed and the only way to get at the excess money was 
to income-split in violation of the Sellers precedent. 
Then, in a transparent effort to justify the inflated housing costs for 
Wife, the trial court increased the value of the marital home, indicating that 
Husband would need to put $70,000 into improvements to increase the 
marital home value to $140,000. As noted above, however, no fact 
supported the trial court's belief that the home required $70,000 of 
improvements, that Husband would make the improvements, or that $70,000 
of improvements would result in a $140,000 home. 
n 
(T. 99—emphasis added). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ultimately, the trial court's alimony order can only be construed as an 
attempt to conceal impermissible income-splitting by making the alimony 
award appear superficially fair. There was no practical effect of imputing 
$70,000 of repairs to the marital home—Husband's financial declaration 
showed that he had the ability to pay Wife's established need either way. 
The trial court was required to base its alimony award on an accurate 
assessment of Wife's standard of living at the time of separation. Wife (and 
Husband and their children) was accustomed to living in a home valued at 
$68,000, with all of the benefits/problems associated with it. And so, with 
regard to housing, Wife's alimony award must be based on the monthly cost 
for a $68,000 home, less the equity from the marital home ($34,000). It 
wasn't. Remand is necessary to correct the trial court's error. 
B. The Trial Court improperly included the minor child's hobby 
expenses when calculating Wife's need for alimony. 
o 
A father has a duty to support his children. A noncustodial father 
must pay child support in accordance with the guidelines, reasonable and 
necessary medical expenses for the child, medical insurance expenses for the 
child, and his share of work-related childcare expenses.9 But absent an 
agreement otherwise, a father is not obligated by statute to pay for 
extracurricular or hobby expenses for children. Presumably, good fathers 
8
 UTAH CODE § 78B-12-105(1) 
9UTAHCODE § 78B-12-111; § 78B-12-212; § 78B-12-214 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
do, bad fathers don't, and some fathers may legitimately disagree with the 
extracurricular activities their children participate in. 
In this case, the parties' minor child participates in horsemanship 
events, raises stock animals, and feeds her two horses. The feed cost for the 
animals fluctuates by season and availability. The hay for 4 horses 
(including the 2 that belong to an adult daughter) costs between $65 and 
$100 per month, resulting in a monthly cost of $33-$50 for the minor child's 
horses. (T. 29, T.44). The feed for the stock animals costs between $75 and 
$200 per month but is only incurred for 4-5 months. (T.47-48). The minor 
child retains all of the money earned when the stock animals are sold for her 
college account. (T. 44-49).10 
On the day of trial, Husband advised the trial court that he was 
absolutely willing to pay his share of the child's hobby expenses.11 But the 
trial court disregarded that offer. Instead, the trial court included 
Notably, the minor child had raised pigs for only one season by the time of trial. 
During that year, she raised three pigs. The feed cost (if calculated at $200.00 per 
month) was between $800 and $1000. The original cost of the pigs is not in 
evidence. One of the three pigs raised was kept and slaughtered. The other two 
were sold, for a total return on investment of $500. (T. 48-49). 
11
 It is unclear from the trial court's findings of fact how the hobby expenses were 
calculated. The maximum feed costs would result in an average monthly expense 
of $133.33 (Calculated by adding $50/month for hay for 2 horses each month plus 
$200/month for stock feed for a period of 5 months). The total hobby expenses for 
the child for the entire year were claimed by Respondent to be $4,296.00 (T.31). 
That amount averages at $358.00 per month. 
1^ 
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$200.00/month for the child's hobby expenses when calculating Wife's 
permanent need for alimony. By doing so, the trial court converted the 
child's fluctuating temporary expense into the Wife's fixed, long-term need. 
The trial court could not directly order Husband to pay for the hobby 
expenses under the child-support statute. But it could have accepted 
Husband's stipulation. Had the trial court done so, the obligation would 
have terminated in less than 5 years when the child turns 18, or sooner if the 
child gave up her hobby. Instead, based on the trail courts ruling, Husband 
is obligated to pay $200.00/month for feed expenses for 22 years—long after 
the child has reached adulthood and stopped participating in 4H. 
Ultimately, the trial court converted the child's temporary maximum 
hobby cost of $7,000.00 (amortized over five years) into a permanent 
alimony expense of $52,800.00. The trial court's decision in that regard is 
improper and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Kelly Farnsworth requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
alimony order and remand for a reduction of monthly alimony. Kelly 
Farnsworth also requests his costs on appeal. 
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SUBMITTED this J ^ day of September, 2011. 
CHIARA & TORGERSON, PLLC 
By. : fl*} 
Don M. Tojfgerson 
Attorney for the Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the 2^ day of September, 2011,1 served two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant on all interested parties as follows: 
McKette H. Allred 
PO Box 57 
Castle Dale, UT 84513 
By Hand 
X? By First Class Mail 
By Facsimile Transmission 
Don M. Tjorgerson 
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McKetteH.Allred#6698 
DAVID M. ALLRED, P.C. 
Attorney(s) for Petitioner 
P.O. Box 575,26 East Main 
Castle Dale, UT 84513 
Phone (435) 381-5326 
FAX (435) 381-5691 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 104700061 
Judge Douglas B. Thomas 
THIS MATTER came before the Honorable Seventh District Court Judge pursuant to 
Petitionees Verified Petition for Divorce. Both parties were represented by counsel at the 
trial which was held on February 4th, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. The Court having heard the testimony of 
witnesses, having received exhibits, having heard arguments from the parties= counsel, and 
being 
fully advised in the premises, having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, renders the following orders: 
IT IS HEREBY DECREED, ADJUDGED AND ORDERED THAT; 
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE 
1. The bonds of matrimony heretofore existing by and between the Petitioner and 
Respondent are hereby dissolved, and Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce, to 
0001 
PAIGE CHRISTINE FARNSWORTH, * 
Petitioner, . * 
* 
v. * 
LOREN KELLY FARNSWORTH, * 
* 
Respondent. * 
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become absolute and final upon entry by the Court. 
CUSTODY 
2. The parties have one minor child to wit: 
Kacey Ann Farnsworth. age 12, born 3-16-1998. 
3. It is in the best interest of the parties' minor child for the parties to be awarded 
joint legal custody of the minor child. Petitioner shall be designated as the custodial parent. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-10.1 et seq., the following parenting plan shall be 
implemented by the parties: 
a. Either parent may make emergency decisions regarding the health or safety 
of the child. The parents shall discuss with each other and mutually 
decide the significant decisions regarding the child, including, but not 
limited to, the child=s education, health care, and religious upbringing. 
The child will be raised and only attend the LJD.S. Church. 
b. If the parties cannot agree to a parenting plan then Respondent may request 
a review of parent time without making a showing of a change of 
circumstances. 
PARENT TIME 
4. Respondent shall be awarded liberal parent time rights with the minor 
child according to the child's desires and wishes, and upon Petitioner's approval, of the child's 
extra-curricular activities schedule. Respondent shall be responsible for the pickup and return of 
the child for his parent time from Petitioner's residence. Neither party shall have the child 
overnight if he/she is spending the night with an unrelated member of the opposite sex. 
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CHILD SUPPORT 
5. Respondent's child support obligation shall be set pursuant to the "Uniform Civil 
Liability for Support Act", Utah Code Ann. '78B-12-112 at $712.00 per month. Respondent 
shall pay Petitioner directly. One-half of the payment shall be paid by the 5 of the month and 
the remaining one-half by the 20th of the month. The Court authorizes the use of the Office of 
Recovery Services. Child support shall continue until the child turns 18 or graduates from high 
school, whichever is the latter event. The parties stipulated to this amount in mediation using 
$1,256.00 for Petitioner's gross monthly income and $5,802.00 for Respondent's gross monthly 
income and the child support worksheet reflects $704.00 as Respondent's obligation but he has 
chosen to pay $712.00 and child support is ordered at such amount. 
MEDICAL 
6. Pursuant to UCA Section 78B-12-212 it is reasonable and proper that: 
a. The parties shall be required to maintain insurance for medical and dental 
expenses for the benefit of the minor child. The parties shall notify the other party of any 
change in his/her insurance policy. 
b. The parties shallequally divide the costs of the premium actually paid by a 
parent for the child=s portion of the insurance. Respondent currently has the child covered on his 
insurance. 
c. The parties shall equally be responsible for all reasonable and necessaiy 
uninsured medical, dental, therapy, orthodontic, optical and pharmaceutical expenses, including 
deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the minor child and actually paid by the parties. 
d. If the parties incur medical or dental expenses on behalf of the minor child, 
they shall provide written verification of the cost and payment of the expenses to the other party 
within 30 days of payment. 
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e. The party may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to 
recover from the other party if he/she fails to comply with the Subparagraph "d" above. 
. f. The party, after being notified of the medical or dental expenses, shall 
pay it within 30 days of notification. 
ALIMONY 
7. Petitioner shall be awarded $1,300.00 a month for alimony for the length of the 
marriage. Alimony shall be terminated earlier by operation of law. 
REAL PROPERTY 
8. The parties do own a home and real property; which was acquired during the 
marriage, located at 385 N. 400 W. Orangeville, Utah, 84537. The home shall be awarded to 
Respondent. Respondent shall pay Petitioner $34,000.00 as her equity in the marital home, 
Petitioner shall vacate the home by April 1, 2011. Respondent shall pay Petitioner her equity in 
the home within 30 days from the Decree so that she can have the money for a down payment on 
another home and can be out by April 1,2011. 
LIFE INSURANCE 
9. Respondent shall maintain a life insurance policy and name the child as the 
beneficiary to secure the child support payment for the minor child. 
SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 
10. The Petitioner testified that the parties had a joint saving's account with a sum of 
$13,000.00. Respondent denied having the account. If there is future evidence of Respondent 
secreting money, it can be brought back before the Court. 
DEBTS 
11. Each party shall be ordered to pay and assume their own debts incurred after the 
parties' separation of April 2010, to the present. Each party shall hold the other party harmless 
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from any liability on these debts. Any unknown debts shall be the responsibility of the party 
who incurred the debt or benefitted from the debt. 
12. The parties have marital debts. Each party shall notify the creditor to whom the 
parties are responsible to pay of their responsibility to pay the debt. The parties shall mail to 
their creditor(s), via certified mail, a certified copy of the Decree of Divorce, along with their 
current mailing address and a letter explaining the Court=s division of debt. The parties shall be 
ordered to keep creditors advised of his/her current mailing address. Each party shall hold the 
other party harmless from any liability on these debts. Any unknown debts shall be the 
responsibility of the party who incurred the debt or benefitted from the debt. The parties shall 
be responsible to pay the following debts: 
Petitioner; 
A. U.S. Bank Credit Card 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
13. The personal property be sold, which includes every gun/, fishing pole, mounts, 
couch, lamp, tools, all of the vehicles, and four wheelers to establish value. The only personal 
property not to be sold are the horses owned by the parties' children, the furniture used by the 
child, saddles and tack associated with children's horses. The proceeds from the sale of the 
personal property shall go to pay off the debt on the horse trailer and then divided equally 
between the parties. 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
14. Both parties shall pay their own attorney fees in this matter. 
DOCUMENTS 
15. Each party shall be ordered to execute and deliver to the other party any 
documents necessary to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the court. 
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Shall a party fail to execute a document within 60 days of the entry of this Divorce Decree, the 
other party may bring an Order to Show Cause at the expense of the disobedient party, including 
attorney fees, and seek that the Court appoint some other person to execute the document 
pursuant to Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Any document executed pursuant to 
Rule 70 has the same effect as if executed by the disobedient party. If a party fails to comply 
with any provision of the Decree of Divorce, and the other party is required to file an order to 
show cause to have the other party comply, the prevailing party shall be awarded his/her court 
costs and attorney fees. 
RESTRAINING ORDERS 
16. Both parties shall be restrained and enjoined from making disparaging remarks 
about the other in front of the child and shall not allow other family members or others to make 
disparaging remarks about the other in the presence of the minor child. The parties shall further 
be restrained from intimidating or harassing the other party or the child. 
FORMER NAME 
17. Respondent shall have her former name of Barnes restored to her if she so 
chooses. 
RETIREMENT 
18. Petitioner shall be awarded one-half of Respondent5 s pension plans through 
UP&L and IBEW and any other sources using the Woodward formula. The parties shall divide 
the costs equally for the costs associated with the preparation of the QDRO's. 
19. The parties have 401k plans. Petitioner has a 401k of $565.33 and Respondent 
has a 401k plan of approximately $1,700.00. The parties shall offset Petitioner's from 
Respondent's amount and divide the remaining balance or equalize through the division and sell 
of the personal property. 
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TAX EXEMPTIONS 
20. Petitioner is awarded the right to claim the minor child commencing in 2011 and 
Respondent is awarded the ngl.it to claim the child commencing in 201.2 and thevparties.sh9ll 
alternate claiming the child -every other year, thereafter. 
DATED this h '~day of _ J ^ d L ^ _ - , 2011. 
•iy^^c^-^/^trjir^ ~ — — 
udge pjpuglas'B^phomas 
Approved^ to form jiod wmenl: 
.....^skms^k^4^! 
Samuel P.Chiara, Attorney for Respondent 
Chiara & Torgerson, PLLC 
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McKetteH.Allred#6698 
DAVID M. ALLRED, P.C. 
Attorney(s) for Petitioner 
P.O. Box 575,26 East Main 
Castle Dale, UT 84513 
Phone(435) 381-5326 
FAX (435) 381-5691 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAIGE CHRISTINE FARNSWORTH, * 
* 
Petitioner, * FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
V. * 
LOREN KELLY FARNSWORTH, * Case No. 104700061 
Respondent. * Judge Douglas B. Thomas 
THIS MATTER came before the Honorable Seventh District Court Judge pursuant to 
Petitionees Verified Petition for Divorce. Both parties were represented by counsel at the 
trial which was held on February 4th, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. The Court having heard the testimony of 
witnesses, having received exhibits, having heard arguments from the parties= counsel, and 
being 
fully advised in the premises, now makes its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
follows. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
1. The parties have been actual and bona fide residents of Emery County, 
State of Utah, for at least three months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action. 
2. The parties are husband and wife having been married on August 27,1988, in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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3. The parties have maintained their marital domicile in the State of Utah. 
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE 
4. Petitioner should be granted a divorce on the grounds of adultery. The Court 
finds that the Respondent did engage in an extra-marital affair in which he had sexual relations 
with another woman to whom he was not married. This makes the marriage irretrievably 
broken. 
CUSTODY 
5. Utah has jurisdiction of this case as it is the home state of the minor child. 
The parties are unaware of any pending case in this or any other state concerning the custody of 
the minor child. 
6. The parties have one minor child to wit: 
Kacey Ann Farnsworth. age 12, bora 3-16-1998. 
7. The parties have stipulated to custody, parent time and other provisions regarding 
the minor child. 
8. It is. in the best interest of the parties' minor child for the parties to be awarded 
joint legal custody of the minor child. Petitioner should be designated as the custodial parent. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-10.1 et seq., the following parenting plan should be 
implemented by the parties: 
a. Either parent may make emergency decisions regarding the health or safety 
of the child. The parents shall discuss with each other and mutually 
decide the significant decisions regarding the child, including, but not 
limited to, the child=s education, health care, and religious upbringing. 
The child will be raised and only attend the L.D.S. Church. 
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b. If the parties cannot agree to a parenting plan then Respondent may request 
a review of parent time without making a showing of a change of 
circumstances. 
PARENT TIME 
8. Respondent should be awarded liberal parent time rights with the minor 
child according to the child's desires and wishes, and upon Petitioner's approval, of the child's 
extra-curricular activities schedule. Respondent should be responsible for the pickup and return 
of the child for his parent time from Petitioner's residence. Neither party should have the child 
overnight if he/she is spending the night with an unrelated member of the opposite sex, 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 
9. The Petitioner has not received public assistance for the parties' minor child 
from the State of Utah. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
10. Respondent's child support obligation should be set pursuant to the "Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act", Utah Code Ann. '78B-12-112 at $712.00 per month. 
Respondent should pay Petitioner directly. One-half of the payment should be paid by the 5th of 
the month and the remaining one-half by the 20th of the month, The Court authorizes the use of 
the Office of Recovery Services. Child support should continue until the child turns 18 or 
graduates from high school, whichever is the latter event. The parties stipulated to this amount 
in mediation using $1,256.00 for Petitioner's gross monthly income and $5,802.00 for 
Respondent's gross monthly income and the child support worksheet reflects $704.00 as 
Respondent's obligation but he has chosen to pay $712.00 and will be ordered at such amount, 
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MEDICAL 
11. Pursuant to UCA Section 78B-12-212 it is reasonable and proper that: 
a. The parties should be required to maintain insurance for medical and dental 
expenses for the benefit of the minor child. The parties should notify the other party of any 
change in his/her insurance policy. 
b. The parties should equally divide the costs of the premium actually paid by a 
parent for the child=s portion of the insurance. Respondent currently has the child covered on his 
insurance. 
c. The parties should equally be responsible for all reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical, dental, therapy, orthodontic, optical and pharmaceutical expenses, including 
deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the minor child and actually paid by the parties. 
d. If the parties incur medical or dental expenses on behalf of the minor child, 
they shall provide written verification of the cost and payment of the expenses to the other party 
within 30 days of payment. 
e. The party may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to 
recover from the other party if he/she fails to comply with the Subparagraph "d" above. 
f. The party, after being notified of the medical or dental expenses, should 
pay it within 30 days of notification. 
ALIMONY 
12. Petitioner should be awarded $1,300.00 a month for alimony for the length of the 
marriage, Alimony may be terminated earlier by operation of law. The Court finds that 
Petitioner has income of $746.00 per month as a school bus driver and a supplemental income 
from Rising Sun of $455,00 per month for a total gross monthly income of $1,200.00 per month 
with tax deductions of $100.00 per month, leaving her with a net income of $1,100.00 per month. 
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The parties stipulated to $712.00 per month as child support which gives Petitioner $1,812.00 per 
month as her income. The Court reviews the Petitioner's Financial Declaration and finds that 
Petitioner testified that she has found a home worth $185,000 in which to purchase for her and 
the minor child. The Court believes that a mortgage of $185,000 is too much to allow Petitioner 
as a necessary expense. The marital home is valued at $68,000 as represented by an appraisal. 
The appraisal includes three acres of land and the Court believes that the land attributes to the 
amount of the appraisal, leaving little value in the home, The home has fallen into disrepair and 
Respondent has failed to make repairs to the home. One example was testified to by Petitioner 
that there was a leak in the roof and so Respondent shoveled the snow off the roof where the leak 
was occurring and stated that he had stopped the leak. The Court finds that Respondent allowed 
the home to fall in disrepair. The Court cannot determine why Respondent let the home fall in 
disrepair but suspects that it may be because of his romantic interests in another woman. 
Respondent bears the responsibility for the home's decline in value. Respondent has the skills 
necessary to bring the home into a habitable structure and Petitioner does not have the skills. In 
light of this, Petitioner should be able to find living arrangements in the amount of $140,000 
which would include the home and horse property to allow Petitioner to maintain the horses. 
Petitioner testified that she could not rent a home for less than $600.00 per month and the Court 
finds that Petitioner would need $700.00 to $710.00 per month for a mortgage payment. The 
Court finds that Petitioner has a need of $400.00 for food and this is reasonable because it is the 
same amount the Respondent states he needs for himself and she will be feeding the minor child 
and herself. Clothing of $200.00 a month is reasonable. The Court finds that $763.00 for 
transportation is too high and finds that $550.00 is a reasonable amount to account for 
maintenance, insurance and fuel. $250.00 for utilities, $45.00 for education, $275.00 for health 
care, $20.00 for health care expenses, $65.00 for cancer insurance, $50,00 for entertainment, 
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$20.00 for donations, $20.00 for gifts, are reasonable expenses. The real property taxes of 
$140.00, real property insurance of $36.41 and $50.00 real property maintenance are reasonable 
expenses and the difference between what it may be when Petitioner purchases a home is 
negligible. The phone bill of $250.00 is excessive and the court finds that $125.00 is more in 
line with having a cell phone and a land phone, The Court will not give credit for the credit card 
expense of $350.00 a month as it was incurred after the parties' separation and has increased 
since the temporary order. The Court will allow $200.00 a month for the horses and animal 
feed. This accounts for the minor child's two horses and stock feed. The adult child will need 
to be responsible to pay for her two horses. This leaves the Petitioner with a need of $3,130.00 to 
$3,140.00 with a short fall of $1,300.00 a month. 
13. When the Court reviews the Respondent's financial declaration and what he 
needs, Respondent hasn't contested that he doesn't have the ability to pay. Respondent has a 
net income of $5,396.36 and after he has paid his monthly expenses, he has a balance of 
$2,070.00 per month. The Court recognizes that Respondent will need to invest money into the 
home and pay Petitioner her equity of $34,000.00 and take out a loan to pay Petitioner her equity 
in the property. The court finds that Respondent will need to make repairs to the marital 
residence that will be awarded to him. The court finds that those repairs will cost about 
$70,000. Respondent will likely need to borrow money to make the repairs and that his monthly 
loan payment for those repairs and the equity payment will be approximately, $560.00 per 
month. Once Respondent makes the repairs, his residence will then be valued at approximately 
$140,000. Respondent and Petitioner will then have equal housing arrangements. The Court 
finds that Respondent has the ability to pay $1,300.00 in alimony to Petitioner. The minor child 
deserves to have an appropriate place to live and stay when she is with each parent. 
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REAL PROPERTY 
14. The parties do own a home and real property, which was acquired during the 
marriage, located at 385 N. 400 W. Orangeville, Utah, 84537. The homes should be awarded to 
Respondent. The home was appraised at $68,000.00 which was evidenced by the appraisal and 
entered as an exhibit. Respondent should pay Petitioner $34,000.00 as her equity in the marital 
home. Petitioner should vacate the home by April 1,2011. Respondent should pay Petitioner 
her equity in the home within 30 days from the Decree so that she can have the money for a down 
payment on another home and can be out by April 1,2011. 
LIFE INSURANCE 
15. Petitioner is not awarded to listed as the beneficiary of Respondent's life 
insurance for the purpose of assuring alimony. The law is that alimony terminates upon the 
death of the party. Respondent should maintain a life insurance policy and name the child as the 
beneficiary to secure the child support payment for the minor child. 
SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 
16. The Petitioner testified that the parties had a joint saving's account with a sum of 
$13",000.00. Respondent denied having the account. If there is future evidence of Respondent 
secreting money, it can be brought back before the Court. 
DEBTS 
17. Each party should be ordered to pay and assume their own debts incurred after the 
parties' separation of April 2010, to the present. Each party should hold the other party 
harmless from any liability on these debts. Any unknown debts should be the responsibility of 
the party who incurred the debt or benefitted from the debt. 
18. The parties have marital debts. Each party shall notify the creditor to whom the 
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parties are responsible to pay of their responsibility to pay the debt. The parties shall mail to 
their creditor(s), via certified mail, a certified copy of the Decree of Divorce, along with their 
current mailing address and a letter explaining the Court=s division of debt. The parties shall be 
ordered to keep creditors advised of his/her current mailing address. Each party should hold 
the other party harmless from any liability on these debts. Any unknown debts should be the 
responsibility of the party who incurred the debt or benefitted from the debt. The parties 
should be responsible to pay the following debts: 
Petitioner: 
A, U.S. Bank Credit Card 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
19. During the course of this marriage the parties have acquired personal property 
but the parties have been unable to agree on the value or method of valuing the personal property. 
The Court has invited the parties to try and resolve the issue of personal property but to no avail. 
Each party has provided documents. Petitioner has presented a list of personal property to be 
awarded to Petitioner and a list to be awarded to Respondent with values listed by each item and 
a total at the bottom of the list. The lists indicate Respondent's personal property being of more 
value than the Petitioners. The Petitioner offers to stipulate that although she finds 
Respondent's property to be of more value, she is willing to offer that both parties be awarded 
the personal property as her lists indicate and that neither party pay the other party the difference 
in value. 
20. Respondent submitted values, his list was not as detailed as Petitioners, but 
Petitioner does not agree to his values. The Court has not received any expert testimony, no 
appraisals of the personal property, no Kelly Blue Book Values for the vehicles. The Court 
does not see that a complete list has been presented to the Court such as tools, household 
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furnishings. The Court finds that it has not received evidence to resolve the personal property 
issue. The parties have presenting evidence to the values of the property but the values differ. 
The Court finds that neither list is credible. The Court has tried to give the parties an 
opportunity to resolve the issue so it doesn't have to order the personal property sold. 
21. The Court orders that the personal property be sold, which includes every gun, 
fishing pole, mounts, couch, lamp, tools, all of the vehicles, and four wheelers to establish value. 
The only personal property not to be sold are the horses owned by the parties5 children, the 
furniture used by the child, saddles and tack associated with children's horses. The proceeds 
from the sale of the personal property should go to pay off the debt on the horse trailer and then 
divided equally between the parties. 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
22. Both parties have stipulated to pay their own attorney fees in this matter. 
DOCUMENTS 
23. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other party any 
documents necessary to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the court. 
Should a party fail to execute a document within 60 days of the entry of this Divorce Decree, the 
other party may bring an Order to Show Cause at the expense of the disobedient party, including 
- attorney fees, and seek that the Court appoint some other person to execute the document 
pursuant to Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Any document executed pursuant to 
Rule 70 has the same effect as if executed by the disobedient party. If a party fails to comply 
with any provision of the Decree of Divorce, and the other party is required to file an order to 
show cause to have the other party comply, the prevailing party should be awarded his/her court 
costs and attorney fees. 
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RESTRAINING ORDERS 
24. Both parties should be restrained and enjoined from making disparaging remarks 
about the other in front of the child and should not allow other family members or others to make 
disparaging remarks about the other in the presence of the minor child. The parties should 
further be restrained from intimidating or harassing the other party or the child. 
FORMER NAME 
25. Respondent should have her former name of Barnes restored to her if she so 
chooses. 
RETIREMENT 
26. Petitioner should be awarded one-half of Respondent's pension plans through 
UP&L and IBEW and any other sources using the Woodward formula. The parties should 
divide the costs equally for the costs associated with the preparation of the QDRO's. 
27. The parties have 401k plans. Petitioner has a 401k of $565.33 and Respondent 
has a 401k plan of approximately $ 1,700.00. The parties should offset Petitioner's from 
Respondent's amount and divide the remaining balance or equalize through the division and sell 
of the personal property. 
TAX EXEMPTIONS 
28. Petitioner is awarded the right to claim the minor child commencing in 2011 and 
Respondent is awarded the right to claim the child commencing in 2012 and the parties should 
alternate claiming the child every other year, thereafter. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, and personal 
jurisdiction over the parties herein. 
2, The Petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce from the Respondent said 
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r* ><y 
Decree of Divorce to become final automatically upon the date of signing and entry by theCourt 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah code Annotated Section 30-3-7(1953 as amended). 
3. The Decree of Divorce should he entered in conformance with the foregoing 
Findings of Pact. 
DATED this iS day of. J%4&m L^> 20 J1. 
O / 
SiSge^uglas 
Approve to form and content: 
1 Is&k^i^-* 
Samuel P.Chianu Attorney for Respondent 
Chiara & 1 orgerson, PLLG 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 30. Husband and Wife 
* ! Chapter 3. Divorce (Refs & Annos) 
-+ § 30-3-5. Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of parties and children-Division 
of debts-Court to have continuing jurisdiction-Custody and parent-time-Determination of ali-
mony—Nonmeritorious petition for modification 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses 
of the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-
payments, co-insurance, and deductibles; 
(b)(i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and mainten-
ance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health, hospital, or 
dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 which will take ef-
fect if at any time a dependent child is covered by both parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of 
the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of 
debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for 
all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employ-
»2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
v / . v - z n * . i y ^ » / 3 *J\J-*J~U Page 2 
ment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that 
the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent 
to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial par-
ent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the chil-
dren and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations 
for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and father after 
entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5)(a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other members of 
the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an 
order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace 
officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made and denied, 
the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that 
action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good 
faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandpar-
ent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted 
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs in-
curred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation 
or parent-time. 
(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying 
for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the mar-
riage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in de-
termining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the 
time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the mar-
riage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the 
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property 
and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through 
the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the 
marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived 
or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony 
based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient 
that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that 
justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, ex-
cept as provided in this Subsection (8). 
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(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's improper 
conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed un-
less, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to 
a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the re-
marriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony 
is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the 
party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
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